



Just Culture

"The single greatest impediment to error prevention in the medical industry is that we punish people for making mistakes."

Dr Lucian Leape Harvard School of Public Health







Case One

- Box of heparin comes to the NICU, says 10 units/ ml on the outside, contains 1000 U/ ml vials
- Pharmacy tech is great, been there 20 years, "wouldn't make a mistake"
- 9 people give 100 times too much heparin to very small children



Heparin Product Similarities Linked to Fatal Medication Errors



February 9, 2007 — The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Baxter Healthcare Corp have warned healthcare professionals via letter regarding the potential for lifethreatening substitution errors due to label colour similarities between 1-mL vials of 10,000 units/mL heparin sodium injection and the 10 units/mL preservative-free heparin lock flush solution (HEP-LOCK U/P).

Dennis Quaid files suit over drug mishap The actor and his wife say the labelling of heparin by the manufacturer helped lead to the accidental overdose of their infant twins.





Organizational Fairness / Just Culture

GENERATIVE

Organization wired for safety and improvement

PROACTIVE

Playing offense - thinking ahead, anticipating, solving problems

SYSTEMATIC

Systems in place to manage hazards

REACTIVE

Playing defence – reacting to events

UNMINDFUL

No awareness of safety culture

Real events are shared by leaders, true culture of accountability and learning.

Clear ways to differentiate individual v. system error, safe to discuss mistakes.

Well understood algorithm, learning is the priority.

Depends who the boss is, blame and punishment are common.

Nothing good will come from talking about mistakes.

F

What does Just Culture look like?

- What are the rules that differentiate unsafe individuals from skilled people trying hard to do the right thing in a complex environment?
- What happens to the incident reports you file?
- What is your degree of confidence that the issues you raise will be addressed and fixed?



Inherent Human Limitations

- Limited memory capacity 5-7 pieces of information in short term memory
 - Cognitive stacking
 - Why is your telephone number 7 digits?
- Inherent error rates
 - Errors of commission 1/300
 - Errors of omission 1/100
- Negative effects of stress
 - Error rates
 - Tunnel vision



Interruptions of Routine Procedures

- Automatic Routines, no explicit memory of the last step, environmental cues predominate
- Interruption leads to Skipped step
- Countermeasures- Explicitly note the interruption. Mindful use of Checklists. Salient reminders.



Perspectives on Human Error - Sidney Dekker

Old View

- Human error is a cause of trouble
- You need to find people's mistakes, bad judgments and inaccurate assessments
- Complex systems are basically safe
- Unreliable, erratic humans undermine system safety
- Make systems safer by restricting the human contribution

New View


- Human error is a symptom of deeper system trouble
- Instead, understand how their assessments and actions made sense at the time — context
- Complex systems are basically unsafe
- Complex systems are tradeoffs between competing goals safety v. efficiency
- People must create safety through practice at all levels




Little Things Can Cause Big Problems

- Room 20
- Look out the window
- A simple knee scope
- He's OK he's not too sedated you go home
- What it says on the box is not what's in the box









FACTOR TYPES	CONTRIBUTORY INFLUENCING FACTOR
Patient Factors	Condition (complexity & seriousness)
	Language and communication
	Personality and social factors
Task and Technology Factors	Task design and clarity of structure
	Availability and use of protocols
	Availability and accuracy of test results
	Decision-making aids
Individual (staff) Factors	Knowledge and skills
	Competence
	Physical and mental health
Team Factors	Verbal communication
	Written communication
	Supervision and seeking help
	Team structure (congruence, consistency, leadership, etc)
Work Environmental Factors	Staffing levels and skills mix
	Workload and shift patterns
	Design, availability and maintenance of equipment
	Administrative and managerial support
	Environment
	Physical
Organisational & Management	Financial resources & constraints
Factors	Organisational structure
	Policy, standards and goals
	Safety culture and priorities
Institutional Context Factors	Economic and regulatory context
	National health service executive
	Links with external organisations

Just Culture – Short Version

- Were they malicious?
- Was the individual knowingly impaired?
- Did they consciously engage in unsafe acts unintentional, risky, reckless?
- Substitution test







The Fair Evaluation and Response Chart

Second, use best judgment to categorize each action as either Reckless, Risky or Unintentional based on the definitions in the Chart. The categorization determines the general level of culpability and possible disciplinary actions, however these general categories require further analysis as below prior to making a final decision.

RECKLESS ACTION

The caregiver knowingly violated a rule and/or made a dangerous or unsafe choice. The decision appears to be self serving and to have been made with little or no concern about risk

RISKY ACTION

The caregiver made a potentially unsafe choice. Their evaluation of relative risk appears to be erroneous.

UNINTENTIONAL ERROR

The caregiver made or participated in an error while working appropriately and in the patients' hest interests

- The caregiver is accountable and needs re-training. Discipline may be warranted
- The caregiver should participate in teaching others the lessons learned.
- The caregiver is accountable and should receive coaching.
- The caregiver should participate in teaching others the lessons learned.
- The caregiver is not accountable.
- The caregiver should participate in investigating why the error occurred and teach others about the results of the investigation.

Partially adapted from David Marx.



The Fair Evaluation and Response Chart

3. Third, perform a Substitution Test by asking at least 3 others with similar skills if they, in a similar situation, would act similarly. If the answer is "No" the individual is accountable. If the answer is "We do it all the time" or answers are divided, assign accountability per below - and remember that an important goal is to ensure others perceive responses as fair:

The system supports reckless action and requires fixing. The caregiver is probably less accountable for the action, and system leaders share in the accountability.


The system supports risky action and requires fixing. The caregiver is probably less accountable for the action, and system leaders share in the accountability.

The system supports error and requires fixing. The system's leaders are accountable and should apply error-proofing improvements.

4. Fourth, evaluate whether the individual has a history of unsafe or problematic acts. If they do, this may influence decisions about the appropriate responsibilities for the individual i.e. they may be in the wrong job. Organizations should have a reasonable and agreed upon statute of limitations for taking these actions into account.

The Substitution Test is a concept of James Reason.





Case Two

- Please read the case report at your tables
- Discuss at the table
- Use what we have discussed and note all the contributing factors and run the decision aids
- Have someone from your table ready to give feedback in plenary



